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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                           
_____________ 
 
No. 10-2554 
_____________ 
 
SUSAN E. BRITTING,  
                          Appellant 
v. 
 
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 
_____________ 
        
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of  Pennsylvania                                                        
District Court  No. 1-08-cv-01747 
District Judge: The Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 25, 2011 
 
Before: McKee, Chief Judge, and SMITH, Circuit Judge, 
and STEARNS, District Judge
*
 
 
(Filed: February 1, 2011) 
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________  
      
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
                                              
*
   The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, United States District Judge for the United States 
District Court of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. 
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 Susan E. Britting began working as a medical transcriptionist for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in its Lebanon, Pennsylvania facility in 
2002.  Years before, Britting had been diagnosed with irritable bowel syndrome 
(IBS).  Around May of 2007, Britting‟s IBS flared up, resulting in an increase in a 
variety of gastrointestinal symptoms.  At about this same time, Britting‟s 
performance as a transcriptionist deteriorated, adversely affecting her accuracy rate 
and the number of lines she was able to transcribe per shift.  By mid-June, 
Britting‟s accuracy rate had fallen from 92% (a “Fully Successful” achievement 
rate) to 85%.  As a result, Jodi Moyer, Britting‟s supervisor, placed Britting on a 
Performance Improvement Plan, which afforded Britting 90 days to demonstrate an 
acceptable level of work.  The Plan also provided for biweekly meetings between 
Moyer and Britting to discuss her work performance.  
Within days, Britting provided Moyer with a letter from her physician, Dr. 
Messmer, which confirmed Britting‟s affliction with IBS and her frequent need to 
use the restroom.  In an effort to accommodate that need, Britting‟s work station 
was moved closer to the restroom.  At about this same time, Moyer advised 
Britting that, because of her diminished accuracy, Moyer would be reviewing 
Britting‟s transcriptions before releasing them to the medical care provider.   
In mid-July, despite Moyer‟s directive, Britting herself released several 
documents to the medical provider before Moyer could complete her review.  
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Britting did this again in August, violating Moyer‟s order a second time. On 
September 4, 2007, Britting received notice of a proposed three-day suspension 
based on her persistent failure to follow Moyer‟s directive.  Two days later, 
Britting again released a transcribed report without Moyer‟s approval.  Within a 
week, Britting received notice that the proposed three-day suspension had been 
replaced with a fifteen-day suspension.  An assessment of her transcription 
revealed an “[o]verall monthly accuracy average of 83%,” demonstrating that her 
accuracy rate continued to deteriorate.   
The interim director of the Lebanon facility reviewed a report that 
considered whether Britting‟s suspension was warranted in light of the twelve 
factors set out in Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 306-07 (1981).  The 
report noted that Britting‟s inability to follow the basic instruction not to release 
her work before it had been reviewed had resulted in serious transcription errors.  
Furthermore, Britting‟s lack of accuracy required the supervisor to review all of 
her work, thereby reducing the department‟s overall productivity.   
On October 15, 2007, Britting received notice of the VA‟s intent to 
terminate her employment.  Although a vacancy existed at the time in the file 
room, management rejected such a transfer because the job required a high degree 
of accuracy and was incompatible with Britting‟s ability.  Britting‟s termination 
became effective on November 27, 2007.  Britting challenged her suspension and 
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termination, but the Merit System Protection Board upheld the VA‟s actions.  
Britting then filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania.  Britting claimed that she was discriminated against on 
the basis of her disability, thereby violating the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 
794(a).
1
  She also sought judicial review of the VA‟s decision to suspend and to 
terminate her employment under 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2).    
At the time of Britting‟s 2007 termination, the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA) was interpreted narrowly and the standard for determining whether an 
individual had a disability included consideration of whether the impairment had a 
permanent or long-term impact.  The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), 
however, rejected this narrow interpretation and reinstated the broad scope of 
protections available under the ADA.  P.L. 110-325, §§ 2 and 3, 122 Stat. 3553, 
3556 (Sept. 25, 2008).  In amending the ADA, Congress set forth several rules of 
construction governing the definition of disability, including that “[a]n impairment 
that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major 
life activity when active.”  Id. § 3(4)(D), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D). 
The VA moved for summary judgment, contending that Britting could not 
establish a disability under the narrow interpretation of that term that prevailed at 
                                              
1
   The Rehabilitation Act specifies that the “standards used to determine whether this 
section has been violated . . . shall be the standards applied” under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.  29 U.S.C. § 794(d). 
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the time she was terminated.  Britting argued to the contrary.  In addition, she 
asserted that the ADAAA was retroactively applicable.  The District Court 
concluded that the ADAAA was not retroactively applicable and that Britting was 
unable to establish a disability under the more demanding standard applicable at 
the time of her termination.  The District Court also concluded that there was 
substantial evidence to support the Merit System Protection Board‟s decision.  This 
timely appeal followed.
2
    
We agree with the District Court that the ADAAA is not retroactively 
applicable.  In deciding whether a statute is retroactively applicable, the Supreme 
Court has instructed that the “first task is to determine whether Congress has 
expressly prescribed the statute‟s proper reach.”  Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 
511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994).  If Congress‟s intent is not clear, “the court must 
determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it 
would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party‟s liability for 
past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already 
completed.”  Id.  Nothing in the ADAAA‟s text expressly prescribes that the 
                                              
2
   The District Court exercised jurisdiction over the Rehabilitation Act claim under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and over the Merit Systems Protections Board appeal under 5 U.S.C. § 
7703(b)(2).  Appellate jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We exercise plenary 
review over the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment” and “apply the same 
standard that the District Court should have applied.”  Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn 
Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).   
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statute is retroactively applicable.  Furthermore, in expanding the definition of 
disability, the ADAAA clearly increased the VA‟s liability for past conduct.  As a 
result, we conclude that the ADAAA cannot be applied retroactively.
3
  
Britting argues that the new statute is nevertheless applicable because it 
effects a waiver of sovereign immunity.  As a result, she contends that it is a 
jurisdictional statute, which (as Landgraf acknowledged) is a kind of legislation 
that is “regularly applied” retroactively.  511 U.S. at 274.  The Landgraf Court‟s 
acknowledgment, however, was qualified:  
Application of a new jurisdictional rule usually “takes away no 
substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the 
case.”  Present law normally governs in such situations because 
jurisdictional statutes “speak to the power of the court rather than to 
the rights or obligations of the parties[.]” 
 
Id. (citations omitted).  By using the term “usually,” Landgraf  signaled that there 
may be instances where a jurisdictional statute may not be applied retroactively.  
Such an instance may arise where the new jurisdictional statute affects a party‟s 
substantive rights or obligations.  Id.  Indeed, the Court concluded in Hughes 
                                              
3
   We are not alone in this conclusion.  Our sister circuits, which have considered the 
question, have uniformly concluded that the ADAAA is not retroactively applicable.  See 
Ragusa v. Malverne Union Free Sch. Dist., 381 F. App‟x. 85, 87 n.2 (2d Cir. 2010);  
Nyrop v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 616 F.3d 728, 734 n.4 (8th Cir. 2010); Thornton v. 
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 587 F.3d 27, 34 n.3 (1st Cir. 2009); Becerril v. Pima County 
Assessor’s Office, 587 F.3d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009); Fredricksen v. United Parcel 
Serv., 581 F.3d 516, 521 n.1 (7th Cir. 2009); Lytes v. DC Water & Sewer Auth., 572 F.3d 
936, 940-42 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Milholland v. Sumner County Bd. of Educ., 569 F.3d 562, 
565-67 (6th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Agro Distribution, LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 469 n.8 (5th Cir. 
2009).  
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Aircraft Co. v. United States, 520 U.S. 939 (1997), that a new statute, which 
eliminated an affirmative defense in qui tam actions, “create[d] jurisdiction where 
none previously existed; it thus speaks not just to the power of a particular court 
but to the substantive rights of the parties as well.  Such a statute, even though 
phrased in „jurisdictional‟ terms, is as much subject to our presumption against 
retroactivity as any other.”  Id. at 951.  Thus, we conclude that the ADAAA, even 
though it may be jurisdictional in nature with regard to the VA, is not retroactively 
applicable because it affects the substantive rights of the parties.  
 Having concluded that the ADAAA is not retroactively applicable, we turn 
to Britting‟s contention that the District Court erred in its determination that she 
did not establish a disability under the more demanding pre-ADAAA standard.  
We conclude that the District Court did not err.  Britting confirmed that her IBS 
was episodic in nature and did not afflict her every day.   
 Finally, Britting contends that her suspension and termination are not 
supported by substantial evidence.  Substantial evidence “„means such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.‟” 
Bradley v. Veterans Admin., 900 F.2d 233, 234 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (quoting Consol. 
Edison Co. v. Labor Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).  Our review of the record 
reveals that there is substantial evidence to support the VA‟s actions. 
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For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.  
